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The Internet, with the speed of its dramatic growth, is considered an explosive 
economic growth opportunity that will redefine global commerce in the information 
age.1  This revolutionary technology presents consumers with an extraordinary new 
means to purchase both innovative and traditional goods and services, to communicate 
more effectively, and to tap into rich sources of information that previously were difficult 
to access and that now can be used to make better-informed decisions.2  Today, millions 
of people access the Internet daily and many have purchased products, services, or 
information online. 
The growth of e-commerce, however, requires consumer confidence, and privacy is 
a key requirement in building online consumer confidence.  An increasing number of 
consumers are concerned with how their personal information is used in the electronic 
marketplace, and many consumers would rather forgo web-provided information and 
products than provide a website their personal information without knowing that sites 
information practices.3  According to the results of a Business Week survey released in 
1998, consumers not currently using the Internet ranked concerns about personal 
information and communication privacy as the foremost reason they have stayed off the 
Internet.4  These findings suggest that effective and meaningful consumer privacy 
protections need to be implemented if the electronic marketplace is to grow significantly.  
Otherwise, consumers will remain wary of engaging in electronic commerce, and this 
new marketplace will fail to reach its full potential.5 
 *  J.D. candidate, Class of 2004, Northwestern University School of Law; Ph.D. candidate, Department 
of Communication Studies, Northwestern University. 
1 Privacy Alliance, Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer 
Protection of the Committee on Commerce Hearing on Online Privacy: Testimony of Ms. Christine Varney 
on Behalf of the Online Privacy Alliance, 2 (Jul. 21, 1998), available at 
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/Varney_July_21.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
2 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Consumer Privacy on the World Wide 
Web before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House 
Committee on Commerce (1998) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission),  
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/07/privac98.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Prepared 
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission]. 
3 Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. and Dr. Alan F. Westin, Commerce, Communications, and Privacy 
Online, A National Survey of Computer Users, 20-21 (1997). 
4 Business Week/Harris Poll: Online Insecurity, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, at 102. 
5 See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 2. 
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¶3 While the significance of privacy protection has been generally recognized, there 
have been broad differences among how various nations governments formulate and 
implement their privacy policies and practices.  Differing definitions of privacy have 
led to numerous and often inconsistent legislative schemes aiming to protect online 
privacy.  These inconsistencies may result in conflicts among governments, and create 





On July 25, 1995, the European Unions Council of Ministers (E.U. Council) 
formally adopted the European Union Privacy Directive (Directive).6  Since it became 
effective on October 25, 1998, the Directive has become a major concern for U.S. 
companies attempting to interact with existing or potential customers and employees in 
the European Union (E.U.).  This concern stems from the Directives requirements that 
non-E.U.-based companies privacy practices either qualify for a Safe Harbor, or reach 
individual compromises with each E.U. country from which data will be extracted.  These 
requirements have not only placed additional costs on the U.S. companies, but also 
placed these companies at a competitive disadvantage.  The Directive also raises 
significant privacy policy issues for the U.S. government, whose privacy practices are 
more lax, resulting in rounds of negotiation between the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(DOC) and the European Union in order to address these policy concerns. 
This perspective focuses on the impact of this important E.U. document on U.S. 
commerce practices, both public and private.  In particular, the perspective uses a 
comparative approach to study the Directive and the policy issues it imposes on the 
United States.  In doing so, this perspective first describes the policy concerns underlying 
the Directive and the means by which these concerns are addressed.  Next, this 
perspective identifies specific problems facing the United States as a result of the 
Directive and discusses reasons why the United States is unwilling or unable to formally 
adopt a privacy policy such as that reflected in the Directive.  Finally, this perspective 
examines the Safe Harbor agreement that the U.S. government has formulated and 
adopted in reaction to the Directive, as well as the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor and 
its future in light of the recent changes in U.S. and E.U. privacy policies. 
II. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO PRIVACY PROTECTION 
When enacted in 1995, the Directive was widely considered the most important 
international development in data protection in the last decade.7  Its comprehensive 
public policy approach is based upon the premise that privacy is a human right and data 
protection is an essential means to protect that right through a coherent and enforceable 
legal regime.8  As early as 1981, the Council of Europe opened for signature and 
ratification a data privacy treaty intended to secure in the territory of each Party for 
6 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OF 23 NOVEMBER 1995 NO L. 281, 31, available 
at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU_Directive_.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004) [hereinafter EU 
Directive]. 
7 Graham Greenleaf, The European Privacy DirectiveCompleted, 2 PRIVACY L. & POLICY REP. 81 
(1995), available at http://austlii.edu.au/~graham/PLPR_EU_1.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
8 Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Orchestrating Transatlantic Approaches to Personal Data 
Protection: A European Perspective, 22 FORDHAM INTL L. J. 2024, 2026 (1999). 
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every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data.9  This rhetoric is clearly reflected in the Directive.  Article 1 
of the Directive dictates that Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right of privacy, with respect to the 
processing of personal data.10  The Directive thus responds to the European Unions 
need to harmonize the previously fragmented European national data protection laws 
within the E.U. Internal Market, where the development of international networks 









Generally, the Directive has two overall objectives: (1) the protection of 
information privacy by Member States of the European Union;12 and (2) the prevention of 
restrictions on the free flow of personal information among E.U. Member States, for 
reasons of privacy protection.13  In other words, by establishing a clear and stable 
regulatory framework that requires a uniform minimum standard of privacy protection 
across the European Union, the Directive aims to ensure both a high level of protection 
for the privacy of individuals in all Member States and the free movement of personal 
data within the European Union. 
In order to realize these two objectives, the Directive comprises a mixture of 
obligations for data processors who control personal data processing, together with the 
enforcement of individuals rights for those who are the subject of data processing.  
These are reflected in a set of information privacy principles set out in Chapter II 
(General Rules on the Lawfulness of the Processing of Personal Data) of the Directive. 
These principles cover four general areas of concern: (1) data quality, (2) legitimate 
processing, (3) rights of data subject and (4) security of data. The first principle, data 
quality, has five specific requirements: 
Fairness/Lawfulness: Personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully;14 
Purpose Limitation: Personal data must be collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with 
those purposes;15 
Relevance: Personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or for which they are 
further processed;16 
Accuracy: Personal data must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to 
date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are 
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they are 
9 Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, 20 
I.L.M. 317, 317 (1981). 
10 EU Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1(1). 
11 Pearce & Platten, supra note 8. 
12 EU Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1(1). 
13 Id. at art. 1(2). 
14 Id. at art. 6(1)(a). 
15 Id. at art. 6(1)(b). 
16 Id. at art. 6(1)(c). 
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Timeliness: Personal data must be kept in a form which permits 
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes 
for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed.18 
The second principle, concerning the legitimate processing of personal data, has six 
requirements: 
Consent: Personal data may be processed only if the data subject has given 
his consent unambiguously;19 
Contract: Personal data may be processed only if processing is necessary for 
the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to 
take steps at the request of the data subject entering the contract;20 
Legal Obligation: Personal data may be processed if processing is necessary 
for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;21 
Vital Interest: Personal data may be processed if processing is necessary in 
order to protect the vital interest of the data subject;22 
Public Interest/Official Authority: Personal data may be processed if 
processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller 
or in the third party to whom the data are disclosed;23 
Legitimate Interest: Personal data may be processed if processing is 
necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the controller 
or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where 
such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1(1).24 
The third principle pertains to rights of the data subject, the person whose personal data is 
collected and transmitted. This principle secures three rights: 
Right of Access: Every data subject has the right to obtain from the controller 
confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are processed and 
information at least as to the purposes of the processing, the categories of 
data concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the 
data are disclosed;25 
Right to Correct/Block Information: Every data subject has the right to obtain 
from the controller the rectification, erasure, or blocking of data, the 
17 Id. at art. 6(1)(d). 
18 Id. at art. 6(1)(e). 
19 Id. at art. 7(a). 
20 Id. at art. 7(b). 
21 Id. at art. 7(c). 
22 Id. at art. 7(d). 
23 Id. at art. 7(e). 
24 Id. at art. 7(f). 
25 Id. at art. 12(1). 
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processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in 






Right to Object: Every data subject has the right to object at any time on 
compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the 
processing of data relating to him.27 
The final principle concerns the security of the collected or transmitted personal data.  
The Directive requires Member States to implement appropriate technical and 
organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful 
destruction or accidental loss and against unauthorized alteration, disclosure or access.28  
The appropriate level of security is determined by balancing the nature of the data 
against the amount of risk involved in the processing of that data.29 
The Directive specifies various mechanisms that aid in the implementation of these 
privacy principles.  It requires that each Member State enact legislation to fully address 
and implement the Directives four information privacy principles.30  Further, each E.U. 
Member State must establish one or more public authorities to oversee and enforce 
privacy protections.  These supervisory authorities should act with complete 
independence, and must have investigative powers, effective powers of intervention in 
processing, and the power to take court action where national legislation implementing 
the Directive is infringed.31 
The Directive also grants individual rights of enforcement.  The Directive requires 
that individuals be granted the right to seek a judicial remedy for any breach of a Member 
States national law regarding information privacy,32 as well as a right to recover 
compensatory damages.33  Dissuasive penalties for breach of national laws, akin to 
punitive damages, are also a required right for individuals, if applicable and appropriate.34 
The Directive also encourages the formulation of codes of conduct for private self-
regulation.  The national supervising authorities of Member States are to issue opinions 
and make provisions for trade associations and other bodies as to whether they comply 
with national laws and the Directive.35  In addition, the Directive establishes a supra-
national administrative supervision of Member States.  The supervision is distributed 
between three bodies: (1) the E.U. Commission; (2) a Committee of representatives of 
E.U. Member States (and in some circumstances, the E.U. Council itself); and (3) an 
advisory working party of the national data protection authorities.  These supervisory 
bodies are responsible for monitoring Member States, recommending implementation 
measures, and administering opinions on the level of protection in the E.U. and in other 
countries.36 
26 Id. at art. 12(2). 
27 Id. at art. 14(a). 
28 Id. at art. 17(1) (emphasis added). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at art. 32. 
31 Id. at art. 28. 
32 Id. at art. 22. 
33 Id. at art. 23. 
34 Id. at art. 24. 
35 Id. at art. 27. 
36 Greenleaf, supra note 7. 
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The adoption and implementation of the E.U. Privacy Directive has brought about 
serious challenges for the United States.  While both the United States and the European 
Union claim to be committed to safeguarding personal privacy, significant differences are 
apparent in terms of how this goal is to be achieved.  This uncertainty has increased 
concerns among the U.S. business community about the impact of the Directive.  Most of 
these concerns focus on Article 25 of the Directive, which prohibits data transfers to any 
country lacking an adequate level of protection, unless certain tightly defined exemptions 
apply.37  This provision reflects the Directives intention to ensure that the high level of 
protection within E.U. borders is not circumvented in cases where personal data 
originally collected or stored in one of Member States is processed or transmitted outside 
the European Union. 
In the European Unions opinion, the United States does not meet the Directives 
standards for the protection of privacy.38  The prospect of U.S. businesses having to await 
the verdict of an E.U. regulatory body before being considered safe destinations for 
personal data transmission has led to suggestions that the European Union is attempting 
to enforce its model of data protection extraterritorially.39  The U.S. business community 
has claimed that the Directive, if it is strictly enforced, may significantly disrupt trans-
Atlantic trade and business planning, as well as impede the development of e-
commerce.40 
There are many examples of how this disruption of business may be manifested. 
For instance, a U.S. credit card company may be unable to process the financial profile of 
a German customer in its Chicago data processing facility.  Alternatively, the purchase by 
a U.K. customer from the U.S.-based Amazon.com may not be completed because the 
customers personal data may not be permitted to be transferred to the online retailers 
website.  Likewise, a U.S.-based firm will have problems trying to transfer the records of 
its French employee back to its New York headquarters.  Similar complications will arise 
in various other sectors of industry where personal data is gathered, processed, and 
distributed transatlantically.  This would include the press, educational institutions, 
telephone networks, health care, airlines, directing marketing, online retailers, and 
banking.41 
IV. THE U.S. APPROACH: WHY THE DIFFERENCE? 
While the European Union and the United States both claim to be committed to 
safeguarding personal privacy, there are fundamental differences between the two in 
terms of how to achieve this goal.  The United States unwillingness (or inability) to 
37 EU Directive, supra note 6, at art. 25 (emphasis added). 
38 Domingo Tan, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet Data Protection 
Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A. INTL & COMP. L.J. 661, 680 
(1999). 
39 See, e.g., Simon Davies, Europe to U.S., No Privacy, No Trade, WIRED 6.05, May 1998, at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/6.05/europe.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004). 
40 See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, U.S. Twitchy on EU Data Privacy, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 16, 1998, 
available at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,15671,00.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004). 
41 Id. 
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formally adopt a privacy policy such as that reflected in the E.U. Directive can be 





First, a cultural and historical difference between the United States and the 
European Union reveal different attitudes about the role of government regulation.  In 
general, E.U. Member States have a much greater confidence in public institutions and 
dependence upon administrative law than does the United States.42  Historically, the 
United States has been reluctant to regulate privacy and has no institutional mechanism 
solely responsible for privacy protection.  Early efforts of privacy advocates in the United 
States were adamantly rejected by the majority of legislators.  For instance, in the early 
1970s, congressional sponsors of privacy legislation, led by Senator Samuel Ervin, Jr. of 
North Carolina, attempted to establish an oversight agency to monitor federal agencies 
collection and use of personal information.43  Opposition to these proposals came from 
various sources.  For example, the interdisciplinary committee that reported to the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare doubted that the need exists or that the 
necessary public support could be marshaled at the present time for an agency of the 
scale and pervasiveness required to regulate all automated personal data systems.44  The 
committee believed that privacy safeguards require the establishment of no new 
mechanisms and seek to impose no new constraints on the application of electronic data 
processing technology beyond those necessary to assure the maintenance of reasonable 
standards of personal privacy in record-keeping.45 
The United States has rejected all attempts to create a comprehensive set of privacy 
standards.  Instead, Congress adopted a piecemeal approach, through narrow legislation, 
scattered in some specific target areas.  Congress and some state legislatures have enacted 
isolated statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act46 and the Video Privacy Protection 
Act.47  These legislative efforts only happened after the discovery of particularly 
scandalous practices (e.g., the use of private information to defame a political figure) and 
only cover the particular activities committed by specific actors, such as consumer credit 
reporting agencies or video rental service providers, respectively. 
Furthermore, the courts have not broadly recognized a right to privacy in 
information held by third parties.  In United States v. Miller, 48 the Supreme Court held 
that an individual has no Fourth Amendment interest to assert when the government 
demands access to the records an organization maintains about him or her (in Miller, 
bank records).  An individuals expectation of privacy for records held by any third party 
is not legitimate, warranted or enforceable under the Constitution.  Miller reduced (and 
possibly eliminated) judicial enforcement of the implementation of any privacy act. 
42 See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES (Cornell University Press 1992). 
43 Id.; see also Harold C. Relyea, The Privacy Act: Emerging Issues and Related Legislation, CRS 
Report RL 30824, (Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30824.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 
2004). 
44 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Secretarys Advisory Committee on Automated 
Personal Data Systems, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, 43 (1973). 
45 Id. 
46 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1970). 
47 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2710-2711 (1994). 
48 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976). 
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¶20 Second, the lack of external institutional control on privacy issues reflects the 
central U.S. model for fair information policy implementation: voluntary compliance and 
self-help.  This model is built upon the philosophy that self-regulation will accomplish 
the most meaningful protection of privacy without government interference, and with the 
greatest flexibility for dynamically developing technologies.49  The theory holds that the 
marketplace will protect privacy because the fair treatment of personal information is 
valuable to consumers; in other words, industry will seek to protect personal information 
in order to gain consumer confidence and maximize profits.50  In The Framework for 
Global Electronic Commerce (known as the Magaziner Report), the White House 
stated that the administration supports private sector efforts now underway to implement 
meaningful, consumer-friendly, self-regulatory privacy regimes.51  It also states that we 
believe that private efforts of industry working in cooperation with consumer groups are 
preferable to government regulation.52  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
acknowledged the same concern in its privacy report to Congress in 1998.  The FTC 
reported that self-regulation is the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure fair 






Finally, the American approach to privacy protection is driven by business 
interests, as compared to the E.U.s rights-based approach.  One commentator noted that 
in effect, the Magaziner Report catered to the industry of personal data rather than 
enshrining the participation of citizens participation in decision about their personal 
data.54  Indeed, the marketplace of personal information is big business in the United 
States.  For example, going back to 1998, the gross annual revenue of companies selling 
personal information and profiles, largely without the knowledge or consent of the 
individuals concerned, was reported US$1.5 billion.55 
The United States unwillingness or inability to adopt a formal, comprehensive 
privacy policy akin to the Directive reflects significant cultural, historical, legislative and 
regulatory differences between the U.S. and the E.U.  How to find compromise and 
formulate a mutually beneficial privacy policy remains a significant challenge to U.S. 
regulators, businesses and policy-makers.  These efforts have already begun, as 
evidenced by the creation of the Safe Harbor. 
V. THE UNITED STATES REACTS: THE SAFE HARBOR 
 Since the adoption of the Directive in 1998, the U.S. government has engaged in 
intense negotiations with the European Union in order to resolve their privacy policy 
49 Joel Reidenberg, Restoring Americans Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
771, 774 (1999). 
50 Id. 
51 The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (Jul. 1, 1997), at 
http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
52 Id. 
53 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (Jun. 1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
54 Reidenberg, supra note 49, at 775. 
55 Id. 
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discrepancies.  On November 1, 2000, the fruits of these negotiations, a Safe Harbor 






Under the Safe Harbor agreement, a U.S. company soliciting personal data from the 
European Union must abide by the following seven criteria in order to receive the E.U. 
data: Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer, Access, Security, Data Integrity and 
Enforcement.57  These criteria are based largely upon the Fair Information Practices 
principles developed by the Federal Trade Commission over the past three decades.58  
Details of these criteria are as follows:   
Notice: Organizations must notify individuals about the purposes for which 
they collect and use their personal information.  Organizations must provide 
information on how individuals may contact the organization with inquiries 
or complaints, the types of third parties to which it discloses the personal 
information and the choices and means the organization offers for limiting 
the use and disclosure of the information.59 
Choice: Organizations must give individuals the opportunity to opt outto 
choose whether their personal information will be disclosed to a third party or 
used for a purpose incompatible with the purpose for which it was originally 
collected or subsequently authorized by that individual.  For sensitive 
information, an affirmative or explicit opt in choice must be given to the 
individual if their information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a 
purpose other than its original or authorized purpose.60 
Onward Transfer (Transfers to Third Parties): In order to disclose 
information to a third party, organizations must apply the Notice and Choice 
principles (above).  Where an organization wishes to transfer information to a 
third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so if it knows that the third 
party subscribes to the Safe Harbor principles or is subject to the Directive or 
other adequacy finding.  As an alternative, the organization may enter into a 
56 U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last visited Jan. 
25, 2004). 
57 Id. 
58 Angela Vitale, The EU Privacy Directive and the Regulating Safe Harbor: the Negative Effects on 
U.S. Legislation concerning Privacy on the Internet, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 321, 338 (2002). 
59 Safe Harbor, supra note 56. 
60 The Department of Commerce does not define what sensitive information is, and an organization 
does not always have to provide opt in choice with respect to sensitive data.  According to the DOC, such 







In the vital interests of the data subject or another person; 
Necessary for the establishment of legal claims or defenses; 
Required to provide medical care or diagnosis; 
Carried out in the course of legitimate activities by a foundation, association or any other non-
profit body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade-union aim and on condition that the 
processing relates solely to the members of the body or to the persons who have regular contact 
with it in connection with its purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third party 
without the consent of the data subjects; 
Necessary to carry out the organizations obligations in the field of employment law; or 
Related to data that are manifestly made public by the individual. 
 Department of Commerce, FAQ 1: Sensitive Data, at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/FAQ1sensitivedataFINAL.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
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written agreement with such third party requiring that the third party provide 










Access: Individuals must have access to personal information about them that 
an organization holds and must be able to correct, amend, or delete that 
information where it is inaccurateexcept where the burden or expense of 
providing access would be disproportionate to the risks to the individuals 
privacy, or where the rights of other persons would be violated.62 
Security: Organizations must take reasonable precautions to protect personal 
information from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration 
and destruction.63 
Data Integrity: Personal information stored or transmitted must be relevant to 
the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization should take 
reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, 
complete and current.64 
Enforcement: In order to ensure compliance with the Safe Harbor principles, 
organizations must have: 
readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms so 
that individuals complaints and disputes can be investigated and 
resolved and damages awarded under applicable law or private sector 
initiatives; 
procedures for verifying that the commitments companies make to 
individuals adhere to the Safe Harbor principles; and 
obligations to remedy problems arising out of a failure to comply with 
the Safe Harbor principles. 
Furthermore, sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by 
the organization. Organizations failing to provide annual self-certification 
letters will no longer appear in the participants list and will no longer be 
assured Safe Harbor benefits.65 
The Safe Harbor agreement is followed by entities on a voluntary basis.66  A company 
may implement all the restrictions of the Safe Harbor, notify the U.S. Department of 
Commerce that the company intends to comply with the Safe Harbor, and publicly 





66 The private sector is still reluctant to implement the Safe Harbor principles.  According to an FTC 
survey, only twenty percent of websites in the Random Sample that collect personal identifying information 
implement, at least in part, all fair information practice principles.  See Federal Trade Commission, 
Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices In 
the Electronic Marketplace before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
United States Senate (May 25, 2000) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade 
Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 
2004). 
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declare compliance on its website.  Alternatively, a company may develop its own self-
regulatory policies, notify the DOC and publicly declare its compliance.67  Finally, 
voluntary compliance may be achieved through complying with a safety seal program 
that notifies the DOC of the companys participation and ensures compliance.68 




At the time of this writing, the Safe Harbor has been in effect for over three years.  
How effectively have the Safe Harbor principles been implemented and enforced?  In the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States has implemented 
anti-terrorism measures that enable the federal government to access its citizens data 
with fewer restrictions.  Meanwhile, the European Union has continued tightening up its 
privacy regulations, as evidenced by the recent implementation of an anti-spam law 
requiring companies to get individuals consent before sending e-mail, tracking personal 
data on websites, or pinpointing callers locations via satellite-linked mobile phones.69  
How do these policy changes affect the Safe Harbor?  This section addresses the 
effectiveness of the Safe Harbor implementation and enforcement, and its future in light 
of these recent U.S. and E.U. privacy policy developments. 
Whether the Safe Harbor principles70 may be effectively implemented and enforced 
has been a concern for both the E.U. and U.S. governments during and after the Safe 
Harbor negotiation process.  The U.S. DOC recognizes three general limitations on the 
application of these principles in the Safe Harbor Preamble.  First, adherence to the Safe 
Harbor principles may be limited to the extent necessary to meet national security, public 
interest, or law enforcement requirements.71  Second, the Safe Harbor principles may not 
apply when U.S. law and government regulations create conflicting obligations or 
explicit authorizations.72  Third, application of the Safe Harbor principles may be limited 
when exceptions are permitted by the Directive or by a Member States national law, 
such as where the transfer of personal data is necessary to satisfy a contractual obligation 
owed by the transferor to an individual.73  Some entities were either cynical about the 
Safe Harbor 74 or doubted whether enough U.S. companies would voluntarily comply 
with it to make it effective.75 
67 Vitale, supra note 58, at 339. 
68 Id. 
69 Associated Press, Anti-Spam Law Goes into Force in Europe (Oct. 31, 2003), available at 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,4149,1369409,00.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
70 See infra Section V. 
71 Safe Harbor, supra note 56. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.; see also Covington & Burling, Privacy: The U.S. Safe Harbors to the European Unions 
Directive on Data Protection, available at http://www.cov.com/publications/download/oid6151/211.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
74 For instance, Evan Hendricks, editor of Privacy Times and a defender of the Directive, thought that 
the Safe Harbor was more political than substantial, and that the only real solution is to have adequate 
privacy legislation in the U.S, cited in Declan McCullagh, Safe Harbor is a Lonely Harbor, WIRED NEWS, 
Jan. 5, 2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,41004,00.html (last visited Jan. 25, 
2004).  The law firm Covington & Burling also expressed its concern that the Safe Harbor may result in 
separate rules for EU citizens and the U.S. citizens, respectively.  See Safe Harbor, supra note 56. 
75 For instance, Andrew Shen, an analyst at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, said, What 
surprised me the most was that the companies, or associations that Commerce had there to talk up safe 
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¶27 One indicator of the status of the Safe Harbor implementation is the number of 
companies that have voluntarily complied with the Safe Harbor.  From its very 
beginning, U.S. companies have been reluctant to volunteer.  On February 1, 2001, three 
months into the program, only twenty companies signed up.76  By May 1, 2001, six 
months into the program, the number of companies increased to thirty-nine.77  By October 
31, 2001, at the completion of one full year of the program, the certified total was 124.78  
The number grew to 225 by August 16, 2002,79 and as of November 22, 2003, the number 
of overall companies signed up for the Safe Harbor only stood at 412.80  Although the 
number itself does not necessarily tell the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor,81 it is evident 
that the Safe Harbor implementation is at least not as effective in scope as it was expected 
to be after three years of implementation.  Some U.S. officials had expressed hope that 
one hundred companies would sign up in the first month, and one thousand within the 




In February 2002, the E.U. Commission of the European Communities 
(Commission) issued a staff working paper (working paper), which assessed the 
effectiveness of the implementation and enforcement of the Safe Harbor principles.83  The 
Commission found that as of December 1, 2001, all of the Safe Harbor agreements 
elements were in place,84 and that it is expected that Safe Harbor membership will 
continue to grow steadily.85  The Commission also found that individuals are able to 
lodge complaints if they believe their rights are being denied, but few have done so [and] 
no complaint so far remains unresolved.86 
harbor were so reluctant to endorse it . . . but its very obvious that the U.S. is going to have a hard time 
getting companies to sign up for it, cited in McCullagh, supra note 74. 
76 The U.S. Department of Commerce maintains a list of companies certified under the Safe Harbor and 
their dates of certification: U.S. Department of Commerce, Web Page for Safe Harbor List, at  
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) 
[hereinafter Safe Harbor List].  The historical data used here was quoted from David A. Castor, Treading 
Water in the Data Privacy Age: An Analysis of Safe Harbors First Year, 12 IND. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 
265, 281 (2002). 
77 Safe Harbor List, supra note 76. 
78 Id. 
79 See E-mail from Michelle ONeill, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Technology 
Industries, to Stefano Rodota, Chairman of the EU Data Protection Working Party, and Susan Binns, 
Director of the European Commission DG Internal Market Data Protection Unit (Aug. 16, 2002), at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/usg_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2004). 
80 See Safe Harbor List, supra note 76. 
81 This is because companies that choose not to join may provide adequate safeguards in other ways, for 
instance, through contracts or an industry Code of Conduct. 
82 See Castor, supra note 76, at n.107. 
83 The Application of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided by the 
Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of 
Commerce, Commission of the European Communities Staff Working Paper, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/adequacy/sec-2002-196/sec-2002-196_en.pdf (last 
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¶29 However, the Commission found that a substantial number of organizations that 
have claimed to adhere to the Safe Harbor do not seem to be observing the expected 
degree of transparency as regards their overall commitment or as regards the contents of 
their privacy policy.87  In particular, the Commission found problems with respect to 






First, voluntary statements of adherence to Safe Harbor principles and/or relevant 
privacy policies were not systematically visible.88  Companies must register with the 
Commerce Department and publicly declare their adherence to the Safe Harbor principles 
in order to enjoy the benefits of Safe Harbor.89  For many organizations, no public 
statement of adherence to the Safe Harbor principles can be found.  For a small number, 
even the privacy policy mentioned in the organizations self-certification could not be 
accessed.90  The Commission therefore concluded that these omissions indicate that Safe 
Harbor participants are in some cases falling short of what the texts require, with a 
resulting loss of transparency and clarity, in particular vis-à-vis the public in general.91 
Second, it appears that privacy policies adopted by self-certified organizations do 
not systematically reflect Safe Harbor principles.  The Commission found that less than 
half of organizations post privacy policies that reflect all seven Safe Harbor Principles.92  
This fact alone was a cause for some concern by the Commission, as the European 
Unions reading of the Safe Harbor reflects that self-regulating participants must have a 
visible privacy policy in conformity with the Safe Harbor principles.93  Failing to 
incorporate all seven principles into a privacy policy is an indication that the organization 
concerned may not have understood and may not therefore be meeting the full range of 
their Safe Harbor obligations.94 
Third, the Commission found that in many cases there was a lack of clarity for 
individuals who might wish to exercise their rights vis-à-vis data about them held by an 
organization in the Safe Harbor.95  Some organizations chose dispute resolution bodies, 
but did not reveal the contact information of these bodies to individuals, while others 
failed to inform individuals of the procedure of making complaints.  Other organizations 
have multiple privacy policies but do not give clear guidance to individuals on which 
polices would apply to them.  In short, there is a possibility that individuals may not 
know what rules apply to the processing of their data, or how they can exercise their 
legitimate rights.96 
The Commission also found problems with respect to the enforcement of the Safe 
Harbor provisions.  The Commission acknowledged that there are a wide variety of 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  The relevant privacy policy refers to the Commerce Departments Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs) on the Safe Harbor.  See FAQ 1: Sensitive Data, supra note 60. 
89 See EU Commission Working Paper, supra note 83.  Also, FAQ 6 states, [a]ll organizations that self-
certify for the Safe Harbor must . . . state in their relevant published privacy policy statements that they 
adhere to the Safe Harbor principles, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/FAQ6SelfCertFINAL.htm (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
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sanctions available to enforce Safe Harbor rules under dispute resolution mechanisms.  
However, it noticed that not all dispute resolution mechanisms have indicated publicly 
their intention to enforce Safe Harbor rules and not all have in place privacy practices 
applicable to themselves that are in conformity with the Principles, as required by Safe 
Harbor rules.97  This type of practice is inconsistent with the requirements of the DOCs 
Frequently Asked Question number 11, which explains that Safe Harbor participants 
are required to choose dispute resolution bodies that provide individuals with full and 
readily available information about how the dispute resolution procedure works when 
individuals file a complaint, and that the dispute resolution mechanisms privacy 
practices conform to Safe Harbor principles.  In other words, although enforcement is a 
key element in the Safe Harbor framework, if the enforcement bodies themselves do not 
conform to the Safe Harbor rules, it is hard (and hypocritical) to enforce the same rules 





The E.U. working paper provides a comprehensive review of the Safe Harbors 
effectiveness.  Particularly, it identifies problems with regard to transparency and 
enforcement, two vital elements in the Safe Harbors self-regulatory framework.  In light 
of the E.U. assessments findings, there are some doubts regarding the level of the 
effectiveness of the Safe Harbors implementation.99 
Policy developments on both sides of the Atlantic in the past three years also have 
had impacts on the Safe Harbors effectiveness.  On the E.U. side, the European 
Parliament and European Council continue to enhance privacy protections.  In the United 
States, Congress adopted anti-terrorism measures after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks that created holes in individuals control over their personal data and their right to 
protect their datas privacy.  These policy developments raise important questions as to 
whether the Safe Harbor will continue to be effective and whether the Safe Harbor 
principles need to exist at all. 
The E.U. Parliament and the Council of the European Union passed a new 
Directive on privacy and electronic communications on July 12, 2002 (New Directive), 
which went into effect on October 31, 2003.100  This New Directive seeks to ensure an 
equivalent level of protection of privacy rights among Member States with respect to 
personal data processing in the electronic communication sector and to ensure the free 
movement of such data and of electronic communication equipment and services in the 
E.U. Community.101  The New Directive has stringent requirements with respect to 
personal data processing in electronic communications that go beyond the scope of the 
Safe Harbor principles. 
97 Id. 
98 The Commission identified six U.S. private sector organizations that have been chosen by 
organizations in the Safe Harbor to operate as their dispute resolution bodies.  These six organizations are: 
the American Arbitration Association, BBBOnline, the Direct Marketing Safe Harbor Program, 
Entertainment Software Rating Board Privacy Online EU Safe Harbor Programme, Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Services and TRUSTe.  See id. 
99 See EU Commission Working Paper, supra note 83. 
100 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications), Eur. Consult. Assoc., available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/law_en.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
101 Id. at art. 1(1). 
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¶37 For example, the anti-spam provision of the New Directive requires that 
unsolicited communications (including communications originative from automatic 
calling machines, fax machines, and e-mail) for direct marketing purposes may only be 
made to subscribers who have given prior consentan opt-in requirement.102  If this 
opt-in requirement is enforced against U.S.-based direct marketing companies, adherence 
to Safe Harbor principles will not help these U.S. companies.  The Safe Harbor Choice 
principle allows for both opt-in and opt-out approaches, but if U.S. companies choose the 
opt-out approach (a common practice of direct marketing businesses), they are in 





The impact of these new requirements on the Safe Harbors effectiveness is 
significant, as the scope of the Safe Harbor framework may be expanded beyond what 
was intended by the European Union and the United States in their original negotiations.  
A potential consequence would be that an additional burden is imposed on U.S. 
companies involved in trans-Atlantic business transactions, forcing them to assume 
additional and more stringent requirements.  The Safe Harbor framework never intended 
such a consequence, but rather was developed to address the adequacy requirements of 
the 1995 Directive.103  If the European Union continues to pass new and stricter privacy 
protection rules that are to be strictly enforced against the U.S. companies, the purpose of 
the Safe Harbor will be defeated, and the Safe Harbor framework may be rendered moot.  
Already, some U.S. companies have chosen to bypass the Safe Harbor and instead have 
adopted E.U.-style policies and practices.104 
On the other hand, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States 
profoundly changed the way the U.S. government handles data protection.  Today, 
Washington is less willing to protect data than it used to be.  During the Clinton 
administration (1992-2000), a Chief Counselor for Privacy position was housed within 
the United States Office of Management and Budget.105  President George W. Bush 
dissolved the post upon taking office.106  Now, the United States top privacy officer is 
affiliated with the Department of Homeland Security.107  Through the enactments of new 
laws and new offices, the government now has more unfettered access to a citizens data 
than ever before.  It is therefore not surprising that the American anti-terrorism measures 
clash dramatically with European privacy laws. 
A key area where such a clash occurs is related to airline Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data.  The U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP, formerly the 
U.S. Customs Service) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), pursuant 
to relevant federal statutes, require that foreign airlines flying into U.S. territory transfer 
to the U.S. administration personal data relating to the passengers and crew members 
102 Id. at art. 13(1). 
103 See Michelle ONeils email to Rodota and Binns, supra note 79. 
104 For example, DuPont and Proctor & Gamble have announced privacy policies that are based on EUs 
model.  See David Scheer, Europes New High-Tech Role: Playing Privacy Cop to the World, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 10, 2003, at A1. 
105 This position was served by Peter Swire, who is now a professor at Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law. 
106 Scheer, supra note 104. 
107 Id. 
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flying to or from the United States.108  Such personal data clearly falls within the 
protection of the 1995 Directive.  Hence, any transfer of this type of data has to be made 
in the presence of adequate safeguards afforded by the U.S. authorities.109  The United 
States tries to address concerns regarding PNR protection and its policy framework in 
Undertakings of the United States Bureau of the Customs and Border Protection and the 
United States Transportation Security Administration (Undertakings).110  Specifically, 
Undertakings addresses issues such as the use, treatment, and protection of PNR data by 
the CBP and the TSA, the treatment of sensitive data, the storage and the methods of 
accessing PNR data, the CBP and TSA computer system security, compliance, and the 
transfer of PNR data to other government authorities.111  The United States hopes that the 




However, in a recent speech to the European Parliament Committee on Citizens 
Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, Frits Bolkestein, E.U. Commission 
member in charge of the Internal Market and Taxation, pointed out that the requisite 
safeguards for PNR data are not present, and that the current level of privacy protection 
over PNR data by U.S. authorities is not adequate.112  Bolkestein identifies four 
shortcomings of the current U.S. policy regarding the PNR data.  First, the Directives 
purpose limitation is violated because the U.S. government does not want to limit its 
use of PNR to the fight against terrorism, but wants to extend its use to other serious 
criminal offenses and is not prepared to narrow this use further.  Second, the scope of 
data required is not sufficiently narrow: the U.S. government requires thirty-nine 
different PNR elements, which is not proportionate to its purpose.  Third, the U.S. 
governments data storage periods for PNR are very long (six to seven years) without 
adequate reason.  Finally, the U.S. governments undertakings are insufficiently legally 
binding to satisfy the Safe Harbor or Directive principles.113 
It is interesting to observe that while the Safe Harbor framework is readily 
available and has been a partially effective instrument to facilitate the data flow between 
108 CBPs legal authority comes from 49 U.S.C. § 44909(c)(3) (1994) and its implementing (interim) 
regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 122.49b, which require that each air carrier operating passenger flights in foreign 
air transportation to or from the United States must provide CBP with electronic access to PNR data, to the 
extent it is collected and contained in the air carriers automated reservation/departure control systems.  
TSAs legal authority comes from the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44901 (2001).  TSA is required to evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft using a computer 
assisted passenger prescreening system. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(A) (1994). 
109 Press Release, European Union, Opinion of the European Data Protection Authorities on the Transfer 
of Passengers Data to the United States (Jun. 17, 2003), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/2003-06-23-prn-apis_en.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
110 See U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection & U.S. Transportation Security Administration, 
Undertakings of the United States Bureau of the Customs and Border Protection and the United States 
Transportation Security Administration (May 22, 2003) (laying out the U.S. approach on the protection of 
the transferred PNR data), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp78-pnrf-annex_en.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Undertakings]. 
111 Id. 
112 Frits Bolkestein, EU/US Talks on Transfers of Airline Passengers Personal Data, Address to 
European Parliament Committee on Citizen Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 
Sept. 9, 2003, SPEECH/03/396, available at http://europa.eu.int (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (on file with the 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property). 
113 Id. 
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E.U. countries and U.S. entities, the CBP and TSA did not choose to entirely adhere to it 
in their Undertakings.  Although some elements of the Safe Harbor framework were 
addressed in Undertakings (e.g., Notice, Access and Security requirements),114 the Choice 
and Enforcement principles are absent from Undertakings.  There are two potential 
explanations for this policy discrepancy: (1) a lack of collaboration between different 
U.S. government agencies (in this case, CBP/TSA and the DOC); and (2) national 
security needs simply trump the need for data protection, and the Safe Harbors 






The clash between U.S. Homeland Security interests and international privacy 
concerns implies that if the United States continues to adopt anti-terrorism measures that 
clash with E.U. privacy law, the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor rules may continue to 
deterioratefirst by the limited number of signatories and the implementation problems, 
then by the limited areas to which the Safe Harbor principles apply.  Once again, the 
United States and the European Union are currently engaging in negotiation again in 
order to come up with a policy framework that compromises the differences of the two 
sides.  It will be interesting to see whether the missing Safe Harbor principles will be 
added to the revised Undertakings. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Safe Harbor agreement between the United States and the European Union has 
been adopted for over three years at the time of this publication, and it has had dramatic 
impacts on privacy policy debate in the United States.  There is evidence that U.S. 
lawmakers have begun to copy the essence of the Safe Harbor agreement in bills they 
propose.  For instance, language in proposed legislation115 reflects the objectives of the 
Safe Harbor and the Directive.116  In addition, the FTC has begun to change its role in 
privacy protection from advocating industry self-regulation to promoting increased 
federal regulation.  If Safe Harbor principles were mimicked in legislation, the FTC 
would have a heightened role in the enforcement of any new legislation because of its 
reliance on Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which declares unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce to be illegal.117 
However, the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor has been limited by both the number 
of companies electing to join and implementation problems relating to transparency and 
enforcement.  The Safe Harbor as an international compromise has been further 
114 See Undertakings, supra note 110. 
115 See, e.g., S. 2928 (the Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act), 106th Cong. (2000), available 
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c106:./temp/~c106reuWuM (last visited Feb. 9, 2004); H.R. 89 
(the Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001), 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/C?c107:./temp/~c107EZw9Ew (last visited Feb. 9, 2004); and S. 2606 (the Consumer Privacy 
Protection Act), 106th Cong. (2000), available at  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/C?c106:./temp/~c106VZsrtB (last visited Feb. 9, 2004). 
116 The Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act, for example, makes it unlawful for a commercial 
website operator to collect personally identifiable information unless certain conditions are satisfied.  The 
website must provide the user with notice that includes identification of the website operator, a list of the 
type of information that might be collected, etc.  These requirements are strikingly similar to those 
requirements in the Safe Harbor agreement.  See S. 2928, 106th Cong. §§ 2(a), 2(b) (2000), supra note 115. 
117 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2001). 
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weakened by the European Unions passage of a more stringent Directive on data 
protection in electronic communication as well as the anti-terrorism measures taken by 
the U.S. government after September 11, 2001.  In addition, recent research has revealed 
that the Safe Harbor agreement has had some unanticipated negative effects on the U.S. 
privacy policy.118 
There is no doubt that the E.U. privacy model has had profound impacts on the 
U.S. privacy policy formulation.  From a civil rights perspective, it is good news that the 
U.S. at least is undergoing some pro-E.U. changes in its privacy protection policy.  
However, the privacy policy conflicts between the United States and the European Union 
will not likely go away.  The European Unions continuing efforts to beef up privacy 
protection will inevitably clash with the United States interests in national security and 
protecting its free market.  What this will do to the development of e-commerce remains 
an issue that only can be resolved in the marketplace.  One thing is for certain, 
howevera compromising policy framework that addresses the needs of both the 
European Union and United States will require innovative ideas and painstaking efforts 
by both sides of the Atlantic. 
118 A detailed discussion of these negative impacts of the Safe Harbor agreement is beyond the scope of 
this perspective.  For more information with respect to this argument, see Vitale, supra note 58, at 341. 
